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Abstract
Purpose  While recently introduced EU regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities (PIE)
aims to improve audit competition and quality, its success and impact depends on the definition of a PIE
applied across the various EU Member States. In the UK, even though little is known about their auditing
choices, these changes will not apply to most private companies despite their importance to the wider economy.
This paper therefore provides an in-depth analysis of the private company audit market and examines the
lobbying behaviour of the accounting profession around the definition of a PIE in the UK.
Design/methodology/approach  Using a large panel of independent private company audits in the UK and
a textual analysis of submitted comment letters to a government consultation on the new regulation, this paper
presents a comprehensive analysis of the audit market for private companies by measuring supplier
concentration using four different measures of market share, and of the lobbying behaviour of the accounting
profession.
Findings  There are two main findings. First, the private company audit market is characterised by low
auditor switching rates along with a tight oligopoly of the largest independent private company audits
maintained by the Big Four audit firms. Second, the lobbying behaviour of accounting and audit firms sought,
and succeeded, to limit the scope of the definition of a Public Interest Entity in the UK, consistent with the
theoretical predictions of monopoly capitalism and the theory of professions.
Originality/value  The paper shows that the definition and scope of a Public Interest Entity needs revisiting
both within the UK and across all EU Member States, with a view to including more of these economically
important private companies and highlights the policy challenge of increasing competition and choice in a
concentrated audit market.
Paper type  research paper.
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21. Introduction
We are an oligopoly - that is undeniableI cant believe the industry will be the same [in the future]. We have to
reduce the level of conflicts anddemonstrate why they are manageable and why the public and all stakeholders
should trust us.
Bill Michael, Chairman, KPMG UK[1]
New EU regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities requires the mandatory rotation of audit
firms and restricts the non-audit services and fees provided and charged by audit firms to all Public Interest
Entities. According to EU legislation, a Public Interest Entity or PIE is defined as: entities whose
transferable securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market; credit institutions; insurance undertakings;
and entities designated by Member States as public-interest entities[2]. While these regulatory changes aim to
reduce concentration and improve audit competition and choice, their success and impact depends on the
definition of a Public Interest Entity applied across the various EU Member States. Although their governance
and performance is crucial for economic growth[3] (Langli and Svanström, 2013), the majority of private
companies within the UK fall outside the narrow scope of the definition of a Public Interest Entity and,
therefore, are not covered by these regulatory changes.
The adverse effects of high levels of supplier concentration on audit competition and audit quality is
a recurring issue raised by regulators and academics (Francis et al., 2013), with particular attention given to the
audit market share held by the Big Four accounting firms. For publicly listed companies, the Big Four audit
firms have an average market share of over 90% in most EU member states (ESCP Europe, 2011). Likewise, in
the UK, the Big Four increasingly dominate the audit market of large listed companies, where they are
responsible for over 95% of audits for the FTSE 350, and all but one of the FTSE 100 companies (Oxera, 2006).
In addition to the potential for systemic risk resulting from high concentration levels, such a market is often
characterised by an infrequent number of auditor switches and overfamiliarity between clients and their
auditors, raising concerns over the quality of individual audits. Consequently, the European Commission
implemented a new EU regulatory framework in 2014 in response to an extensive consultation process, which
amended the EU Directive on Statutory Audits of Annual and Consolidated Accounts. In conjunction with
these changes, the European Commission further introduced new EU-wide Regulation on the Statutory Audit
of Public Interest Entities, which were effective from June 2016. This regulation makes significant changes to
audit markets as all Public Interest Entities in the EU are subject to a mandatory rotation of their auditor and
restrictions placed on the non-audit services and fees provided and charged by audit firms to their clients.
However, the success and impact of these regulatory changes depends on the definition of a Public Interest
Entity which, while defined at an EU level, has also been expanded by some Member States, leading to
considerable variation across the different legal regimes.
In the UK, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) defined listed companies and certain unlisted
banking and insurance companies as Public Interest Entities regardless of their size. Although the governance
of these firms and their significant contribution to employment, productivity, and economic growth is
important to the UK economy, most private companies within the UK are not covered by the regulatory
changes irrespective of their economic importance. Conversely, in Denmark for example, the definition is
much broader and includes a size criterion[4], consistent with the view that larger organisations (quoted or
unquoted) are systemically important to the Danish economy. Relative to the wider definition applied by some
Member States, the narrower definition of a Public Interest Entity for the UK has led to concerns in both
Europe and Commonwealth countries that UK legislation is being manipulated to suit existing structures,
rather than the outcomes sought by the EU legislative framework (ICAEW, 2015a).
While there are several studies that examine the audit market for private firms, there is no evidence
on the lobbying of governments on changes to regulation with respect to private firm audits i.e. the definition
of Public Interest Entities. From a theoretical perspective, monopoly capitalism predicts concentration in
industries through time such that an oligopolistic structure emerges (Cowling, 1982). This structure has been
documented in both the public firm audit market (e.g. Francis et al., 2013) and the private firm audit market
(e.g. Peel, 1997). However, monopoly capitalism and the neo-Weberian perspective in the theory of professions
predict that firms will seek to protect the interests of the profession rather than the public interest (e.g. Loeb,
1972). Moreover, firms will use their dominant position to maintain or improve their economic power due to
regulatory capture (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2012) and, in the context of the audit industry, lobby and use
public interest arguments to protect their economic self-interest (Lee, 1995). Our paper, therefore, examines
3audit concentration in the market for private firm audits and the lobbying around the introduction of the new
EU regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities.
To do so, we start by performing a detailed empirical analysis of concentration in the audit market
for private firms utilising a large panel of independent private company audits in the UK from 2005 to 2012.
We focus on the UK for two reasons. First, concerns have been raised over the UKs narrow definition of a
Public Interest Entity and whether UK legislation is being implemented in a way to suit existing structures.
Second, because of the difficulties in accessing data, the exact market share of private company audits conducted
by the Big Four is often difficult to measure. Supplier concentration in audit markets is best measured using
audit fee data, however, audit fee data are not publicly available in many countries (Willekens and Achmadi,
2003). Relative to other EU Member States, UK private company data is more accessible, and we are therefore
able to download and analyse proprietary data, including audit fees, for a large sample of independent private
companies.
Our initial results confirm the evidence of prior studies that there is a high level of audit market
concentration. Moreover, when supplier concentration levels are measured by the number of audit
appointments, the market share of larger audit firms is significantly understated compared to when supplier
concentration is measured by either audit fees or client-firm size. The Big Four, therefore, appear to audit most
private companies that provide them with the greatest economic rents i.e. the largest private firms. Crucially,
when we partition our sample by firm size, we find that the market share of the Big Four exceeds economists
tight oligopoly threshold of 60% (Shepherd and Shepherd, 2003) for the largest independent private
companies.
Next, we examine the lobbying of the UK government around the time of the regulatory reform to
investigate whether lobbying occurred to limit the scope of the new legislation. As predicted by the neo-
Weberian perspective of professions, monopoly capitalism as described by Cowling (1982), and evidenced in
prior research (e.g. Lee, 1995; Hansen, 2011), the Big Four audit firms, other accounting firms, and professional
accountancy bodies, overwhelmingly lobbied in favour of a narrow definition of a Public Interest Entity in
the UK. To this end they agreed that the focus of the public interest is shareholders and prudential regulators.
Their rationale is simple; the impact of failure of these public, or systemically important, firms would fall on
a broad investor base. However, the consequence of this lobbying, and the narrow definition now employed
in the UK, is that the audit of large private firms remains outside the definition of a Public Interest Entity, and
so the status quo for private firm audit markets remains, despite it being a tight oligopoly.
As a result of our analysis, we believe that further consideration should be given to the risks associated
with excluding large private firms from the more stringent audit engagement regulations applicable to other
Public Interest Entities. As it stands, these firms have been excluded from the more rigorous audit requirements
placed on large listed firms and systemically important institutions such as banks, based on a narrow definition
of the public interest. If wider definitions of the public interest, as described by Posner (1974) and Stigler (1971),
were to be applied within the UK and other EU Member States, large private firms would be subject to some
degree of auditor rotation. It is worth noting that this does not solve fully the problems of concentration, as
large private firms by construction require a large auditor. Switching is, therefore, likely to be from one Big
Four firm to another Big Four firm. However, the process of switching and mandatory re-tendering of business
would be a significant step forward in trying to ensure greater scrutiny and oversight of these economically
important entities, and would increase competition and choice, albeit by a small amount.
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. The next section presents our theoretical
framework. Section 3 outlines the recent audit reform by the European Union and discusses prior literature.
Section 4 discusses our sample selection process and provides descriptive statistics, and Section 5 measures audit
market concentration and examines the lobbying of the UK government around the scope of the definition of
a PIE. We end with a discussion of our results and conclusions in Section 6 and Section 7.
2. Theoretical Framework
To analyse concentration in private firm audits and to understand if the current regulatory regime is
appropriate, we bring together three important areas of theory. First, we view the existence or need for
regulation through public interest theory, whereby regulation is used to maximize welfare and to limit market
failure. Second, we look at both the role of professions and the need for regulation. Third, and related to the
role of professions, we look at monopoly capitalism and its predictions for the structure of the audit market
and the consequences of this.
2.1 Public Interest Theory of Regulation
4The public interest theory of regulation explains the existence of regulation as a response to market failure that
seeks to protect the public at large. This theory of regulation has its origins in the work of Posner (1974) and
Stigler (1971). Posner (1974) recognises that regulation is motived by two key drivers. First, markets are
susceptible to failure, and second, that regulation has zero transaction costs. Prior to this characterization,
Stigler (1971) developed the Economic Theory of Regulation, whereby regulation exists not to protect the
interest of the public at large but the interests of groups.
Regulation, under public interest theory as developed from the positions of Posner (1974) and Stigler
(1971), predicts that interventions seek to protect the public interest, as there is some form of market failure.
Since then, the definition of public interest theory has been expanded to incorporate a broader view, whereby
public interest theory is a system of ideas, which takes the normative position that when market failure occurs,
regulation should be imposed to maximise social welfare (Hantke-Domas, 2003).
2.2 Public Interest and the Professions
Freidson (1989) argues that professions should be concerned with the public interest and not on personal gain.
This position, as set out in the theoretical tenets from the sociology of the professions, states that professions
are conferred the privileged status of a profession, as they work in the public interest. The classic view as set
out by Freidson (1989) is based on the work of Durkheim whom, from a functionalist position, views society
as a complex system made up of parts that work in tandem to promote solidarity and stability. A key part of
functionalist theory is different parts of society are composed of social institutions. As such, each is designed
to meet a particular need, and so the evolution of these social institutions has consequences for the form and
shape of society.
A key outcome of this position is that if professions work in the public interest in the way described
above, then there is no need for regulation. Regulation in the public interest is therefore only necessary when
market failure occurs. However, there are long debates as to whether the conferment of the status of a
profession is a signal of an institution that works in the public interest or whether it is simply a signifier of
prestige. Whereby, underneath the designation of being a profession, such institutions are no different from
any other profit-seeking organisation (Larson, 1977). Such a view is consistent with the neo-Weberian
perspective, whereby professions exist to serve their own private interests and obtain monopolistic positions
to provide services.
In the context of the accounting literature, there is a substantive body of work that supports the view
that the audit profession does not work in the public interest. Consequently, the audit profession seeks to
protect the interests of the profession rather than the public (See for example, Loeb, 1972; Montagna, 1974;
Parker, 1994; Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001; Sikka, 2001; Baker, 2005). To this end, there is evidence that
lobbying is used by the accounting profession to influence accounting regulation (Meier et al., 1993; Lee, 1995;
McLeay et al., 2000; Hansen, 2011; Reuter and Messner, 2015). Given this, and as evidenced by the proposed
aims of the changes to the regulatory regime across Europe, audit firms may well require regulation to ensure
that they work in the public rather than private interest.
2.3 Monopoly Capitalism
The monopoly capitalism model of Cowling (1982) has its foundations in the work of Kalecki (1939) and Baran
and Sweezy (1966). The key prediction of models of monopoly capitalism is that developed economies are
dominated by firms that operate in oligopolistic industries (Sawyer, 1988). Despite the empirical evidence to
support markets being structured in this manner, the dominant narrative is that markets are competitive
(Cowling and Tomlinson, 2012). However, the model of Cowling (1982) makes a number of predictions
regarding, concentration, collusion, and elasticity of demand, whereby firms manipulate these factors to
increase profits, which is the measure of the degree of monopoly. In the context of the audit industry, firms
will seek to increase concentration for example through mergers, as this will increase profits (Owen, 2003).
The consequence of which will be a small number of very large audit firms and a large number of very small
audit firms.
Implicit in the model of monopoly capitalism is the view that firms seek to maximize profits rather
that to work in the public interest. Concentration, therefore, puts increasing amounts of economic power in
the hands of a small number of very large market actors and increases the barriers to entry for new firms to
emerge. Moreover, markets can appear to be competitive as there are a large number of firms present. However,
a natural consequence of the concentration of economic power in a few large actors is that regulation and
intervention by the state do not always mitigate the consequences of concentration. Rather, large firms
maintain their dominant position through a process of regulatory capture (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2012), a
5practise of which the large audit firms are certainly capable (Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Cooper and Robson,
2006; Humphrey et al., 2009).
2.4 Predictions
From the above theories, there are two predictions that emerge about the structure of the audit market for
private firms. First, and has been well documented in the accounting literature previously, the market is
dominated by the Big Four auditors. Second, current regulation is narrow and unlikely to impact on the
dominant position of the largest market actors and lobbying on any proposed regulatory changes to the current
regime will be to protect the profession and not the public interest, and to ensure a narrow definition of a
Public Interest Entity.
3. Regulatory Background and Prior Literature
For a number of years, academic studies have raised awareness of the high levels of audit market concentration
in a number of countries, such as the US (Wolk et al., 2001), Germany (Quick and Wolz, 1999), UK (Beattie
and Fearnley, 1994; Pong, 1999b; Beattie et al., 2003; Arnold, 2009; Abidin et al., 2010), across the EU (Ballas
and Fafaliou, 2008), and internationally (Francis et al., 2013). Moreover, regulators, market participants and
academics have raised concerns that a high level of supplier concentration within audit markets by the
dominant audit firms, coupled with low levels of auditor switching, may impair independence and audit quality
(e.g., Beattie et al., 2003; Oxera, 2006; Ballas and Fafaliou, 2008; Abidin et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2011; Francis
et al., 2013). More recently, auditors have been criticised for their failure to identify the 2007-2008 Global
Financial Crisis (Hopwood, 2009; Sikka, 2009), and alert investors to the high risk assets held by banks (Arnold,
2009; House of Lords, 2010). Post-crisis, inspection reports by Member States revealed that the lengthy
relationships between auditors and their clients had resulted in the auditors exercising low levels of professional
scepticism and performing inadequate procedures for the audits of major companies (EC, 2013).
3.1 Reform of the EU Statutory Audit Market (2014)
The European Commission (EC), therefore, embarked upon an extensive consultation process, culminating in
the release of the Green Paper on Audit Policy in October 2010 which raised concerns over the Big Four
dominance of audit markets (EC, 2010). Consequently, in 2011, the EC proposed significant audit regulatory
changes (EC, 2011a; EC, 2011b) and, in 2013, the European Parliament and EU Member States reached
agreement on a number of audit reforms (EC, 2013). These reforms were then approved by the European
Parliament in 2014, who issued a revised Statutory Audit Directive[5] and a new EU Regulation on the
Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities, which became effective from June 2016 (EC, 2014a).
The Statutory Audit Directive sets out the auditors duties and regulates all statutory audits in the EU,
regardless of whether the audited entity is a Public Interest Entity. However, the new EU Regulation only
enforces stricter legal requirements for the statutory audits of Public Interest Entities (PIEs). The stricter legal
requirements for Public Interest Entities include the mandatory rotation of the auditor for Public Interest
Entities after a period of ten years, joint audit and tendering incentives, a list of non-audit services that audit
firms may not provide to their clients and a cap on the fees charged for non-audit services that are provided[6].
Justifying their decision for stricter audit regulation of Public Interest Entities, the EC argue that undetected
material misstatements have disproportionally greater consequences for society, the shareholders and investors
of these firms than for other undertakings (EC, 2014b, p.4). Any costs associated with complying with the new
EU Regulation should, therefore, be outweighed by the greater audit assurance resulting from reducing the
overfamiliarity between auditors and their clients, increasing the choice between audit firms, and lowering the
levels of concentration in the top-end of the audit market (EC, 2014a).
3.2 Defining a Public Interest Entity
However, the imprecise definition of a Public Interest Entity provided by the EC has led to a variety of
interpretations across EU Member States, which could limit the intended impact and success of these reforms
(FEE, 2014). For example, Table 1, which summarises the definitions of Public Interest Entities across EU
Member States, shows France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden applying the
minimum requirements while Denmark, Italy and Spain expand the definition to include other entities such
as investment companies, large non-listed companies, state owned companies, and pension funds. Table 1,
further, shows that the definition of a Public Interest Entity has not been widely extended within the UK.
[Insert: Table 1. Overview of the definition of a Public Interest Entity (PIE) applicable across Europe]
6When deciding the scope of the Public Interest Entity definition in the UK, the Department of Business
Innovation and Skills (BIS) and FRC launched parallel consultation documents. While the BIS did not propose
to widen the definition, the FRC suggested including entities, currently outside the scope of the Public Interest
Entity definition, but which may be of sufficient public interest to warrant applying some, but not all, of the
more stringent requirements applicable to Public Interest Entities (FRC, 2014b, p.25). Nevertheless, the idea
of extending the Public Interest Entity definition was opposed due to the perceived additional costs and risk
of placing these firms at a relative disadvantage to their European counterparts. However, since the FRCs
definition of a listed entity[7] is broader than the EUs, the focus of the discussion was aimed towards the
application of the definition to smaller companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), rather
than the effect of extending this regulation to larger private firms. Therefore, in its current form, the
Regulation does not apply to the majority of private companies in the UK, despite their overall importance to
the wider economy and the market for audit services.
As a result, the European Commission has raised concerns over the UKs definition of a Public
Interest Entity, suggesting that UK legislation was manipulated to suit existing structures rather than the
intended outcomes of the EU legislative framework (ICAEW, 2015a, p.7). Moreover, the ICAEW has
questioned the sense of using the new Public Interest Entity definition alongside the existing classification of a
major audit[8] within the UK, which will lead to some large private entities being classed as major audits for
an Audit Quality Review (AQR), while being excluded from the regulatory requirements applicable to Public
Interest Entities. The ICAEW has, therefore, recommended the FRC re-examine the regulatory framework
for corporate entities in the UK with a view to incorporating certain non-quoted firms within the definition
of a Public Interest Entity given the risk to the UK economy in light of their financial failure (ICAEW, 2015a,
p.7).
Alternatively, the FRC may consider adopting a tiered approach which could see some of the new
regulatory requirements, currently only applicable to Public Interest Entities, being applied to larger private
entities (ICAEW, 2015b, p.7). Given the limited understanding and knowledge of the private company audit
market, excluding all private companies from the more stringent audit regulations applicable to Public Interest
Entities seems premature, particularly given the substantial size of some of these firms[9].
3.3 Private Company Audit Market
Despite their often substantial size and economic importance little is known about the auditing choices of
private firms (Francis et al., 2011, p.489). To date only one paper focuses solely on supplier concentration in
the private company audit market. Peel (1997) finds 28.6% of his large sample of private firms were audited by
the Big Six between 1994 and 1995, and when dividing the sample by company turnover, the Big Six market
share rose from 15.9% for the subdivision of the smallest to 94.1% for the subdivision of the largest private
companies. However, due to data collection problems Peel (1997) is unable to go further in his analysis and
provide a measure of supplier concentration based on audit fees, nor is he able to make comparisons to
additional measures of concentration and thus only provides a limited picture of the UK private firm audit
market.
While a small number of studies have examined the private company audit market share of the larger
audit firms, their data collection methods and sample compositions vary greatly (Moizer and Turley, 1987;
Abidin et al., 2010). For example, in a study on audit pricing, Chaney et al. (2004) finds around half their sample
of 15,484 private firms use a Big Five auditor between 1994 and 1998 and, similar to Peel (1997), reports the
Big Five audit 87% of the largest private companies, compared to 28% of the smallest audit firms. However,
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) reports the Big Five audit only 19% of their sample of 54,778 private companies
between 1990-2000 when investigating the earnings quality of private UK firms. Moreover, Clatworthy et al.
(2009) reports an even lower Big Four market share of 8.3% when studying whether a Big Four premium exists
in the private firm audit market in 1994 and suggests that the difference between their findings and Chaney et
al. (2004) may be attributable to the different data collection methods from the Bureau van Dijk Financial
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database.
These studies may, further, be misstating the real market share of the large audit firms since they
measure market share primarily using the number of clients audited by each firm rather than the audit fees
earned from these clients, which provides a better measure of the output required by each auditor (Moizer and
Turley, 1989). Moreover, the reported audit market share of the large audit firms may be misrepresented due
to the sample of private companies used. For example, Lennox and Pittman (2011) finds the Big Four audit
between 6% and 7% of their sample of 5,139 private companies in 2003 and 2004, yet their sample is only
comprised of smaller private companies which were recently exempt from a statutory audit. Finally, the
7reported private company audit market share will depend on the independence of the private companies within
the sample since auditor hiring decisions are routinely made by the holding company rather than the subsidiary
(Lennox and Pittman, 2011).
This limited, and often mixed, evidence for the private company audit market, therefore, suggests that
the decision to preclude most private companies from the definition of a Public Interest Entity, effectively
excluding them from the new audit reforms, may be hasty, particularly since these reforms were introduced
to improve both audit competition and quality. The greater heterogeneity and wide-ranging size of private
firms makes the role of auditing less obvious and a constant market share across all sub-sectors by the large
audit firms less likely. Consequently, the audit market for large private companies may exhibit concentration
levels and systemic risks similar to those observed in the public company audit market, yet there is no planned
regulatory intervention to address this. Therefore, given the recent audit reforms for Public Interest Entities,
an in-depth review of the audit market for private firms is timely and necessary to determine whether
economically important private companies should be subject to similar audit requirements as applicable to
Public Interest Entities.
4. Data
4.1 Sample Selection
Consistent with prior studies examining the audit market for private UK companies, our data is extracted from
the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database published by Bureau van Dijk, a major publisher of
business information who specialise in private company data in addition to software for searching and
analysing companies. FAME is the most extensive publicly available source of UK corporate data and provides
comprehensive financial and non-financial information on over 8 million private and public companies within
the UK and Ireland. The information available on FAME includes: adverse filings, directors and managers,
financial strength metrics including credit scores, credit ratings, county court judgements (on non-payment),
shareholders and subsidiaries, corporate structures, family firms, M&A deals and rumours, industry
descriptions, SIC codes, and research, news, and company accounts and documents. The data used in this study
focuses on company accounts, and come from original filings at Companies House, which is an executive
agency, sponsored by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy of the UK Government. In
the UK, Companies House incorporate and dissolves limited companies, registers the information companies
are legally required to supply, and makes that information available to the public.
To ensure that no firms in our sample have an individual shareholder with sole power to influence
the choice of auditor, we start by selecting all active independent, private companies with audited financial
statements for the period 2005-2012[10]. Next, we remove any firms identified as switching status from a
private to public or public to private company during the sample period. Further, to identify and remove firms
within the financial or utilities sectors (e.g., Firth, 1997; Lennox and Pittman, 2011; Dedman and Kausar, 2012)
we retain only those companies with a valid SIC (2007) code. Firms in these industries have unique operating
reporting requirements and include unlisted credit institutions and insurance undertakings, which are already
classified as Public Interest Entities. From this sample, we then remove all firms without the necessary annual
accounting data such as total assets, a minimum turnover of £1,000, a disclosed profit or loss figure, a minimum
audit fee of £1,000[11], and a registered office location for a minimum period of two consecutive years. A firms
registered office location is taken into consideration because audit fees of firms located in particular regions,
for example London, are expected to reflect the higher cost of living differentials (Peel, 2013) which may affect
market share when based on fees. Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005) we then exclude all firm-years where
either the key accounting or audit information is missing or internally inconsistent.[12] Finally, we trim all
key accounting variables[13] at the 1% and 99% levels leaving a final sample of 8,314 independent companies
and 36,118 observations.
We classify the audit firms within our sample into Big Four and Non-Big Four, since the Big Four
audit firms compete, to a large extent, with non-Big Four audit suppliers in the market for private company
audits (Dutillieux et al., 2013, p.962). However, the traditional distinction between Big Four and non-Big Four
audit firms may be inadequate for an audit market study which focuses on private independent company audits
(Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008). Therefore, we further divide our sample of non-Big Four audit firms
into three groups of Mid Four, Small-Tier, and non-major audit firms using the FRCs Key Facts and Trends
in the Accountancy Profession reports for the relevant years covered by our sample period.
[Insert: Table 2. Classification of the major UK audit firms and key characteristics]
8Table 2 reports the categorisation of the Big Four, Mid Four, and Small-Tier audit firms, along with
their average annual audit fee income, number of UK offices and number of UK partners for our sample period.
In total, these firms report a combined average annual audit fee income of £2.2 billion of which the Big Four
firms earn 78% (£1.7 billion). By comparison, the Mid Four earn 13% (£288 million) of the total audit fee
income, with the remaining 9% (£195 million) being shared between the Small-Tier firms. In terms of audit fee
income, therefore, the Big Four are the market leaders. However, there are still significant differences between
these four individual firms. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers average annual audit fee income is £560.8
million, over 1.7 times greater than Ernst & Youngs average income of £315.8 million. Compared to the Big
Four, the Mid Four firms earn a far lower average income from audit fees with Grant Thornton earning the
highest income of £93.4 million while, at £52.7 million, PKF (UK) earned the lowest. Finally, for a Small-Tier
audit firm, their average audit fee income ranges between £6.8 million and £38.3 million, substantially lower
than the lowest Mid-Four income and confirming the importance of expanding the classification of non-Big
Four audit firms.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics by Year: 2005-2012
Table 3 reports our descriptive statistics by audit firm group presenting the mean of each variable on both an
annual and aggregate basis. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Peel, 1997; Clatworthy et al., 2009) companies
audited by the Big Four are significantly larger than clients of the non-Big Four audit firms. For example, in
Panel A, Big Four audit clients generate an average turnover of £75 million[14], while, in Panel B, Mid-Four
clients generate a significantly lower turnover of £25.1 million. Further, the average turnover of a Small-Tier
or Non-major audit client is lower still at £16.4 million and £10 million respectively. Other measures of client
firm size, such as total assets and number of employees, continue to highlight the significant differences
between the audit clients of each group of audit firms. For example, an average Big Four audit client employs
just over 500 staff, while an average client of a Non-major audit firm employs less than 130 people.
[Insert: Table 3. Descriptive statistics by year 2005-2012]
The size of the audit client is an important determinant of audit fees as this reflects the amount of
audit effort required (Pong and Whittington, 1994; Chi, 2004; Feldman, 2006; Oxera, 2006; McMeeking et al.,
2007). Consistent with this, Table 3 shows the Big Four audit firms receive an average audit fee of £49,992[15],
almost five times the average fee of £10,219 paid to a Non-major audit firm. In addition to audit services, clients
may purchase non-audit services from their auditor[16] which, while relatively similar across all audit groups,
shows the average non-audit fees paid by private companies are either close to or above the 70% limit to be
applied to Public Interest Entities (EC, 2014b, p.8). Moreover, as the type of non-audit services provided cannot
be determined, it may be possible that some of these non-audit services will be prohibited for audit clients
qualifying as Public Interest Entities.
In addition to concerns about concentration, both EU and UK investigations raised concerns about
the low levels of auditor switching and the lengthy auditor tenures for listed companies. Auditor switches are
infrequent events with only 2% of FTSE 100 companies and 4% of all listed companies switching auditor
between 1995 and 2004 (Oxera, 2006) while 31% (67%) of FTSE 100 companies and 20% (52%) of FTSE 250
companies employed the same auditor for more than 20 (10) years (Competition Commission, 2013). Our
findings in Table 3 show that the audit switching rates for private companies are just as low with an average
of between 3.05% to 4.46% switches across our four groups of audit firms[17]. Moreover, while the exact length
of the auditor-client relationship cannot be determined from FAME, the low switching rate implies that the
auditor tenures for these private companies could be similar to those already documented for listed companies,
which is unlikely to change without similar regulatory intervention applicable to Public Interest Entities.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics by Company Size
Given the importance of auditee size in determining the choice of auditor, we partition our sample into deciles
based on each companys total assets and report further statistics in Table 4[18]. Panel A shows average total
assets (turnover) increase from £313,000 (£848,000) in the first decile rising up to £196 million (£120 million)
in the largest decile, nearly ten times larger than the average total assets of a private company in the ninth
decile. Further, highlighting the significant size of the average private company in our largest decile, in
untabulated results, we find that, collectively, in 2012, companies in this decile employed approximately
430,000 people and contributed more than 5% of the UK GDP based on sales revenue[19].
9[Insert: Table 4. Descriptive statistics by company size]
Consistent with fees being determined by size, Panel B reports average audit fees rising from £2,799 for the
smallest private companies up to £76,931 for the largest, comparable to the £84,900 average audit fees paid by
FTSE Fledgling companies in 2004, but notably lower than the audit fees paid in the FTSE Small Cap or FTSE
100 (Oxera, 2006). Given audit fees relate closely to the size of the auditee, the audit fees-to-sales ratio allows a
better comparison between the audit fees of listed and non-listed firms. Panel B, therefore, reports our fee-to-
sales ratio for each decile, which shows a steady fall from 1.32% in the first decile to 0.17% in the tenth, most
likely due to fixed costs and audit scale economies (Abidin et al., 2010). By comparison, in 2004, audit fees
represented 0.05% of the median turnover of FTSE 100 companies, 0.13% of the FTSE Small Cap, and 0.20%
of the FTSE Fledgling (Oxera, 2006), similar to the fees-to-sales ratio of 0.17% for the largest private companies.
Client size, therefore, appears to drive audit fees irrespective of listing status. Further, Panel B shows private
companies purchase a large proportion of non-audit services, regardless of their size. Together with the low
switching rates, this raises concerns regarding the overfamiliarity of auditors and their clients and highlights
the need for regulators to re-examine the audit regulatory requirements applicable to these companies.
In summary, the audit market for private independent companies appears to share many
characteristics found in the audit market for listed companies. Consequently, given the substantial size and
subsequent economic importance of these entities, the audit market for private companies may require similar
reforms to the auditing regulations for Public Interest Entities. To provide a more detailed understanding of
the audit market for private companies we, therefore, proceed by examining the audit choice of private firms
and audit market concentration levels in more detail.
5. Analysis
5.1 Measuring Audit Market Concentration
Audit market concentration has traditionally been measured using the k-firm concentration ratio (Cn) and the
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) (e.g., McMeeking et al., 2007; Abidin et al., 2010). More recently, the Gini-
coefficient, which is traditionally used in economic analyses to measure wealth inequality has been used (e.g.,
Quick and Wolz, 1999; Abidin et al., 2010). Therefore, since the Cn is the most widely used method, we define
our first measure of audit market share as follows:ܥܴ௞ = σ ௫೔ೖభσ ௫೔೙భ (1)
Where CR is the concentration ratio calculated for k audit firms, n is the total size of the market, and xi is the
size of the audit firm measured by a proxy e.g., number of clients or total audit fees. Modern industrial
economics use the level of concentration present in a market to classify it into one of four categories[20].
However, this is not a perfect measure of market concentration since it only accounts for the market share of
the largest n firms, ignoring all others (Pong, 1999a). In spite of it not being a perfect measure, because of its
frequent use in prior studies, it enables us to compare supplier concentration in the private company audit
market with the levels of supplier concentration found in listed firm markets.
The HHI is argued to be a better measure of market concentration as it accounts for all active firms
and provides a better indication of the relative market control of the largest audit firms (Wootton et al., 1994;
Pong, 1999a; Wolk et al., 2001), which we define as follows:ܪܪܫ = σ ௫೔మ೙భ൫σ ௫೔೙భ ൯మ (2)
Where HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, n is total size of the market, and xi is the size of the audit firm.
The HHI can range from 0, for an industry with many active firms of equal size, to 10,000, for an industry
with only one active firm. However, there are different interpretations of what threshold indicates a highly
concentrated market. For example, the US Department of Justice classify markets as competitive if the HHI
is below 1,000, moderately concentrated from 1,500 to 2,500, and highly concentrated if above 2,500.
Conversely, Europe considers a market with a HHI exceeding 1,000 as concentrated, and highly concentrated
when greater than 2,000 (Barty and Ricketts, 2014). Moreover, the HHI still gives greater weight to large firms
and, despite the differences which exist between the Cn and HHI, the two measures can be highly correlated
(Pong, 1999a). For our third measure of concentration we, therefore, use the Gini coefficient, which is a market
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wide measure of concentration that does not place greater weight on larger audit firms, nor is it easily affected
by changes in population size, as follows:ܩ݅݊݅ = ଶ௡మ௫ҧ σ ቂቀ݅ െ ௡ାଵଶ ቁ ݔ௜ቃ௡௜ୀଵ (3)
Where Gini is the Gini coefficient, ݔҧ = ଵ௡ σ ݔ௜௡௜ୀଵ , n is the total size of the market, and xi is the size of the audit
firm. The Gini coefficient can range from 0, for a market with perfect equality, to 100 for a market with perfect
inequality.
For all three models of market concentration, different measures of market share can be used. While
prior audit studies generally use the number of audits as their main proxy, largely due to the minimal data
required, this may understate an audit firms real value of their market share (Moizer and Turley, 1989). Using
audit fees as an alternative measure, therefore, is less likely to understate a firms market share and should
provide a more accurate representation of an audit firms output since the measure is not sensitive to the overall
population size (Pong, 1999a).
Using Equations (1) to (3), Table 5 reports the levels of auditor concentration based on the number
of audits and total audit fees, for our pooled sample, and across size deciles[21] based on total assets[22]. Our
findings in Panel A, which estimates market share based on the number of audits, shows audit market
concentration levels for the pooled sample are relatively low. Specifically, 13% of private company audits are
performed by the Big Four audit firms, which is comparable to the 8.3% reported by Clatworthy et al. (2009)
in their cross-sectional study of private UK firms. Further, when combined, the Big Four and Mid Four audit
firms (Big Eight) account for only 24% of all private company audits, implying these two groups each audit
similar numbers of clients. The low levels of market concentration are further supported by a HHI market
share measure of 108, well below the European threshold of 1,000 for a concentrated market, and a Gini
coefficient of 55.82, which is much lower than the 86.12 to 96.09 reported by Abidin et al. (2010) for listed UK
companies. On the surface, therefore, the pooled results imply a competitive audit market for private UK
companies, thereby supporting the view that further regulatory intervention in this market may be
unnecessary.
[Insert: Table 5. Auditor concentration in the UK private company market]
However, in reality, the notion of a competitive audit market for all private companies disappears if
market concentration is reported by size deciles and, as we do in Panel B, estimated using audit fees, rather
than the number of audits. This is particularly evident for the largest 10% of private UK companies where the
market share of the Big Four rises to 62% in Panel B, exceeding the 60% threshold of a tight oligopoly
(Shepherd and Shepherd, 2003). The Big Four, therefore, dominate the audits of larger private companies
which provide them with the greatest economic rents. Moreover, while the HHI is below the Competition
and Markets Authority (CMA) standard for a concentrated market in the first nine deciles, the HHI of 1,095
for the largest firm decile exceeds the CMA threshold for concentration. To put this into context with the
listed company audit market, the HHI based on audit fees was 2,561 for the FTSE 100 and 1,739 for the FTSE
Fledgling for the year 2004 (Oxera, 2006). This again raise concerns about the level of competition and choice
in the audit market for the largest private companies. In such a concentrated market, firms will seek to maintain
their oligopolistic position (Cowling, 1982), and protect the interests of the profession rather than the public
(See for example, Loeb, 1972; Montagna, 1974; Parker, 1994; Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001; Sikka, 2001; Baker,
2005). To this end, we next examine the lobbying on the scope of the definition of a Public Interest Entity in
the UK. Consistent with the neo-Weberian perspective, we use the theories of professions and monopoly
capitalism and predict audit firms will lobby to protect the profession and by extension the current market
structure, by limiting the scope of the definition.
5.2 Lobbying and Defining the Scope of Public Interest Entities
To test whether this behaviour is observed, we collect and examine the lobbying of BIS, the government
department that ran the consultation on the reforms to the regulatory framework for statutory audit within
the context of the new European Union Audit Reforms (Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation No
537/2014)[23]. First, we categorize all respondents to this consultation according to their organization type e.g.
Big Four, non-Big Four, Regulator, etc., as presented in Table 6. Next, we follow McLeay et al. (2000) and read
through and analyse each individual response. In our case we identify whether a respondent was for, against,
or did not respond to the question on expanding the definition of a Public Interest Entity. In addition, to
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triangulate our results, and ensure that our interpretation was correct, we engaged three other accounting
academics, who are also qualified Chartered Accountants, to independently categorize the responses[24].
Finally, we compared our summary of responses to the summary statistics of the responses compiled by BIS
in their final report. In looking at the breakdown of the responses, once those who did not comment on the
specific question on the expansion of the definition are removed, one telling fact is that over two thirds (21
out of 31) of the responses come from accountancy and audit firms, including all Big Four firms, professional
accountancy bodies, and accounting trade bodies.
[Insert: Table 6. Lobbying responses by organization type]
Before examining these responses in more detail. There are two responses that must first be considered.
One is from Association of Accounting Technicians (AAT) who responded that the definition should be
expanded, and the other is from the National Audit Office (NAO). In looking to expand the definition of a
Public Interest Entity, one way in which this could be done would be to include public sector bodies. Here,
the AAT felt that the definition should be expanded such that,
entities substantially dependent upon public moneyssuch as providers of public utilities and services, as well as
charities. In addition, commercial entities which are dependent upon publicly funded contracts or grants should fall
within the definition of a PIE, as well as listed entities. [25]
While the NAO concluded,
the NAO already adopts an audit approach that encompasses many of the more stringent requirements for listed
entities and the EU Directive and Regulation for PIEs for all of our client base. [26]
From Table 6 the first key finding is that outside of the issue of public sector funding discussed above,
not one of the responses was in favour of expanding the definition of a Public Interest Entity. Specifically, the
government asked,
Do you agree that the Government should not expand the definition of a PIE beyond the EU minimum requirement
 that is listed companies, banks, building societies and insurers? Please provide further information in support of
your answer? [27]
By examining the submitted responses, and through investigation of the governments own
conclusions, a common theme occurs. First, any expansion of the definition of a Public Interest Entity is seen
as gold plating of the regulation; a description that is common in many of the responses (9 out of 31). Second,
the most common reasons for applying a narrower definition (14 out of 31) are that any expansion would
result in a significant increase in the costs, administrative burden, and complexity for companies that would
be classified as a Public Interest Entity for the first time. In looking at the submissions from the Big Four, the
comment from Deloitte below is most telling,
We welcome the Governments decisions made as a result of the earlier Discussion Document on the implications of
the EU and wider reforms. We believe that your proposed approach has correctly balanced the interests of investors,
the public and audited entities, and in particular prioritised the public interest by focussing on the interests of
shareholders and prudential regulators of entities with the biggest impact on a broad base of investors or which could
give rise to systemic risk.[28]
It is very clear that the definition of the public interest here is restricted to investors and that the
public interest is confined to those firms where shareholder losses are the key concern. In agreeing to this view,
which is consistent with the earlier lobbying that occurred, the government is restricting the definition of what
is in the public interest to systemically important financial firms and large listed companies. The market for
private firm audits is therefore left firmly outside the scope of a Public Interest Entity.
Similarly, PWC stated that,
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We agree that the definition of a PIE should not be expanded beyond the EU minimum requirement. This definition
was agreed following negotiations in Europe and reflects the underlying aim of the Regulation and the Directive
which is to focus on entities where there is a public interest, and which could give rise to systemic risk.[29]
6. Discussion of Results
Having examined concentration in the private firm audit market and the lobbying carried out around the
consultation on the scope of the definition of a Public Interest Entity, we now discuss the predictions of our
theoretical framework and the implications of our results.
Our first prediction was that the market is dominated by the Big Four auditors. Consistent with prior
research, our results show private firm audit markets are segmented with Big Four dominance among the
largest private firms. Moreover, our analysis shows that this market meets the economic definition for a tight
oligopoly, which raises concerns about competition and choice in the market for large private firm audits. Our
second prediction was that the lobbying to the consultation on the scope of the definition of Public Interest
Entities would seek to limit the scope of the definition. Based on the results of the analysis of the lobbying
that occurred, it is clear the accounting and audit firms, including all Big Four firms, as well as professional
accounting bodies, did not seek to expand the definition to include economically important private firms.
In looking at these two findings together, there are several issues that emerge. First, and as predicted
by monopoly capitalism, there is a significant concentration in the private firm audit market. Second, and as
predicted by the theory of the professions and the public interest, the lobbying that was observed was to limit
the scope of the definition of what constitutes a Public Interest Entity. Such a result is also consistent with the
substantive evidence found in the literatures that examine lobbying behaviour and self-interest of the
accounting profession (Meier et al., 1993; Lee, 1995; McLeay et al., 2000; Hansen, 2011; Reuter and Messner,
2015). To resist any regulatory changes that would result in mandatory rotation requirements is also rational
within the context of recent evidence that shows a tenure linked audit fee premium for Big Four firms (Ghosh
and Siriviriyakul, 2018). The consequence of successfully lobbying to restrict the definition of a Public Interest
Entity however, is to allow the oligopolistic market structure to remain, and the rent seeking by the largest
auditors to continue. Consequently, competition and choice in the market for economically important private
firm audits remains limited at best.
While concentration does not necessarily lead to poor audit quality (Francis et al., 2013), a lack of
competition and choice in a market is wholly undesirable as it leads to potential conflicts and uncompetitive
pricing. We, therefore, believe that further consideration should be given to the risks associated with excluding
large private firms from the more stringent audit regulations applicable to other Public Interest Entities. If
wider definitions of the public interest were to be included, such as those described by Posner (1974), large
private firms would be subject to some degree of audit rotation within the UK and potentially within other
EU Member States.
It is worth noting, however, that such a solution does not solve fully the problems of concentration.
Large private firms by construction require a large auditor given the size and complexity of these firms.
Consequently, switching is likely to be from a Big Four firm to another Big Four firm. In debating the rules
for public firms, Lord Hodgson said that,
There are only four major firms in the PIE space  all other auditing practices are at present effectively also-rans 
so there are only four entrants in the race, one of which must be ruled out because it will be the current auditor, and
another may be ruled out because it is providing corporate finance or other services. We have a race of only two horses.
This is what we call competition. There is bound to be the effect of taking in each others dirty washing or passing the
buck around when you have that limited number of participants.[30]
The dominance of the Big Four firms in public firm audit is therefore unlikely to be impacted by the
current regulation for the reasons above. However, large private firms that are economically important but
currently outside the definition of a Public Interest Entity are subject to even less scrutiny due to concentration
and long tenure. As such, while imperfect, the process of switching and mandatory re-tendering of business
would be a significant step forward in trying to ensure greater competition and choice in the market for private
sector audits.
7. Summary
New regulation on the Statutory Audit of Public Interest Entities came into effect in June 2016 and required
the mandatory rotation of companys auditors every ten years, prohibiting the provision of certain non-audit
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services by audit firms to their clients and capping the fees charged for non-audit services that are provided.
These reforms should result in greater levels of audit assurance by reducing the overfamiliarity between
auditors and their clients, increasing the choice between audit firms, and lowering the levels of concentration
at the top-end of the audit market. However, rather than affecting all companies, these changes only apply to
those firms defined as Public Interest Entities which, according to the European Commission, are companies
where undetected material misstatement would have disproportionally greater consequences for society,
shareholders, and investors, compared to any other firms.
The imprecise nature of this definition has therefore led to a variety of interpretations across EU
Member States, which may limit the intended impact and success of these reforms. Moreover, the narrow
definition of a Public Interest Entity applied in the UK has been met with unease from the European
Commission and questions have been raised as to whether UK legislation is being implemented to suit existing
structures (ICAEW, 2015a). This leads to the question as to whether the definition of a Public Interest Entity
in the UK is justified or whether, by excluding private companies by applying a narrow definition of a Public
Interest Entity, the result is the exclusion firms that many would consider to be in the public interest from the
more stringent audit regulation observed for firms that are currently considered Public Interest Entities.
Using a large panel of independent private company audits in the UK from 2005 to 2012 we first
provide a comprehensive analysis of the private company audit market. The results of this analysis, consistent
with prior research and the predictions of monopoly capitalism Cowling (1982), show that larger audit firms,
and most notably the Big Four, audit the majority of large private companies in the UK. Moreover, by
partitioning our sample by auditee size, we show that the Big Four maintain a tight oligopoly of the largest
independent private company audits, which is of significant concern in looking at competition and choice in
this market.
We next examine the lobbying of the Department for Business Innovation and Skills in the UK, the
government department that ran the consultation on the reforms to the regulatory framework for statutory
audit. Consistent with a neo-Weberian view, theories of the professions and monopoly capitalism (Cowling
(1982), and extant research that examines lobbying by the accounting profession (e.g. Meier et al., 1993; Lee,
1995; McLeay et al., 2000; Hansen, 2011; Reuter and Messner, 2015), we find that accounting and audit firms
lobby to protect the profession. The observed lobbying was successful in maintaining a narrow definition of a
Public Interest Entity. Consequently, the oligopolistic structure we observe in the market for large private
firm audits, which is arguably not in the public interest, remains. It is worth noting that Francis et al. (2013)
state that concentration does not necessarily result in a poor quality audit. However, considering the economic
impact of mandatory rotation on fee premiums, especially in the largest firms (Ghosh and Siriviriyakul, 2018),
concentration of this nature has implications for competition and choice in the market for private firm audits.
The structure of the market should, therefore, be examined carefully, especially as lobbying around the
definition of a Public Interest Entity sought to limit the scope of the definition and by extension, maintain the
status quo.
In looking at potential remedies to the issue of choice and competition in the audit market for large
private firms, there are no easy solutions. Given the complex nature of many large private firms, it would be
difficult for a smaller auditor to provide an equivalent audit to one provided by a Big Four firm and hold a
portfolio of clients. However, if large private firms were to be included in the definition of a Public Interest
Entity, while imperfect, the process of switching and mandatory re-tendering of business would help ensure
increased competition and choice in this sector of the audit market. That said, although switching rates would
increase, the segmentation in the market would continue, as switches would be mostly occur laterally between
the Big Four. From a policy perspective, this therefore creates a significant challenge to generate real
competition and choice for which there are no easy answers.
Notes
1 Source: Big Four accountancy firms plan for forced break-up, Financial Times, 16th May 2018.
2 According to the Statutory Audit Directive 2014/56/EU (Article 2, point 13) the definition of a public-
interest entity is as follows: (a) entities governed by the law of a Member State whose transferable securities
are admitted to trading on a regulated market of any Member State within the meaning of point 14 of Article
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4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC; (b) credit institutions as defined in point 1 of Article 3(1) of Directive
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), other than those referred to in Article 2 of
that Directive; (c) insurance undertakings within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 91/674/EEC; or (d)
entities designated by Member States as public-interest entities, for instance undertakings that are of significant
public relevance because of the nature of their business, their size or the number of their employees.
3 In January 2015 private companies accounted for just over 99.7% of the effective Companies House register.
4 Any firm exceeding 2 out of 3 criteria concerning number of employees, asset values, and turnover are
considered Public Interest Entities.
5 Statutory Audit Directive 2014/56/EU amends the Directive 2006/43/EC.
6 Member States can allow Public Interest Entities to extend the audit engagement (1) by an additional 10 years
upon tender; (2) or by an additional 14 years in case of joint audit (EC, 2014b); prohibited non-audit services
includes: tax, consultancy and advisory services; if an firm provides non-audit services for three of more years
fees are limited to no more than 70% of the average fees paid in the last three years by the audited entity.
7 The FRC defines a listed entity as an entity whose shares, stock or debt are quoted or listed on a recognized
stock exchange, or are marketed under the regulations of a recognized stock exchange or other equivalent body
(FRC, 2014b, p.21)
8 A major audit is an audit conducted under UK law in respect of a Public Interest Entity; or any other
person in whose financial condition there is a major public interest. This includes UK unquoted companies,
groups of companies, limited liability partnerships or industrial and provident societies with Group turnover
in excess of £500million (FRC, 2014a).
9 In the UK, the Top Track 100 ranks Britains largest private companies by sales, a typical Top Track 100
company has sales ranging between £700 million and £3 billion and has between 500 and 20,000 employees.
In 2012, the Top Track 100 included private companies with turnover ranging from £617 million to £25,400
million (Fast Track, 2014), of which the Big Four were responsible for auditing just over 80%, with the
remainder of firms mostly being audited by the Mid Four.
10 The FAME database characterises the degree of independence of a company with regard to the ownership
of shareholders and included in the download are companies that do not possess a single shareholder with
enough power to influence auditor choice.
11 Oxera (2006) reports median audit fees, as a percentage of company turnover, for FTSE 100 firms to be
0.05%, increasing to 0.20% for the smaller FTSE fledgling companies. In a sample of smaller private firms,
audit fees as a percentage of sales is expected to be higher than those for listed firms and a fees to sales ratio of
10% would provide us with a minimum fee threshold of £1,000 (based on the minimum turnover in the final
sample being £13,000).
12 These data filters mostly result in a number of smaller private companies being excluded and, while this
may limit out insights of the audit market for the smallest private companies, it does not impact our findings
and discussion of whether the audit market for large independent private companies may require similar
reforms to those applicable to PIEs.
13 For example, profit to sales ratio, fees to sales ratio, return on assets and percentage change in audit fees.
14 Clatworthy et al. (2009) report average turnover (total assets) of £39.41 million (£35.62 million) for Big Four
auditees. Although similar steps were taken during downloads there are differences between the average size
of the companies which likely results from the higher audit fee threshold used in the current paper (£1,000) in
comparison to the smaller threshold (£100) used by Clatworthy et al. (2009) which will result in the exclusion
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of smaller client-firms. The nature and timing of each sample will also affect the firm composition due the
requirement in the current paper for firms to possess consecutive years of accounting data.
15 In comparison, Clatworthy et al. (2009) report average audit fees of £29,050 for Big Four clients.
16 Small and medium sized companies are not required to disclose the fees received by auditors in respect of
non-audit services, the proportion of companies reporting non-audit fees is reported in Table 3.
17 Audit switches are identified by comparing current and prior year auditors for each company in our sample,
and classifying a change (no change) in audit firm, or both audit firms in the case of a joint audit, as 1 (0), but
excluding changes resulting from audit firm mergers.
18 The number of companies present in each size decile vary for each year of the sample (i.e. one decile always
contains 10% of the sample for that year) with the same firm potentially appearing in different deciles
depending on yearly sample composition. To control for this, when reporting results by decile, the figures in
the table are calculated on both a yearly and an aggregate basis, with the average of the yearly figures being
compared with the aggregate figures. As the results are similar, we reported the aggregate figures for brevity.
Our annual results are available on request.
19 In 2012 real GDP for the UK was £1.5 trillion (Office of National Statistics, 2013) and the total turnover of
the sample firms included in decile ten for the year 2012 totalled £75.4 billion.
20 The research field defines four main categories of market: (1) monopoly  one firm has a market share of
100%, (2) a dominant firm  one firm has a market share between 40% and 99%, (3) a tight oligopoly  four
firms possess a 60% market share, and (4) effective competition - four firms have less than 40% market share
and entry into the market is free (Shepherd and Shepherd, 2003, p.13).
21 The number of companies present in each size decile vary for each year of the sample (i.e. one decile always
contains 10% of the sample for that year) with the same firm potentially appearing in different deciles
depending on yearly sample composition. To control for this, when reporting results by decile, the figures in
the table are calculated on both a yearly and an aggregate basis, with the average of the yearly figures being
compared with the aggregate figures. As the results are similar we reported the aggregate figures for brevity.
Our annual results are available on request.
22 Our results remain robust to partitioning our sample over time and to estimating our market concentration
measures using total assets or total sales. So, for brevity, we only report the average statistics for our main
concentration measures and partition our sample by size deciles.
23 Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/auditor-regulation-effects-of-the-eu-and-wider-
reforms [Accessed 30 May 2018]
24 Here if there was disagreement we would have iterated and discussed differences in interpretation until
agreement was reached. However, there was only one dissenting submission that wished to see an expanded
definition. All other responses were explicit in stating that the definition of a Public Interest Entity should not
be expanded.
25 Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473633/BIS-15-
610-summary-of-responses.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2018]
26 Source: Ibid
27 Source: Ibid
28 Source: Ibid
29 Source: Ibid
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30 Source: http://economia.icaew.com/en/news/june-2016/big-four-will-take-in-each-others-dirty-washing-
under-new-audit-law [Accessed 30 May 2018]
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Tables
Table 1. Overview of the definition of a Public Interest Entity (PIE) applicable across Europe
Country
Expand on 2014 EU PIE
definition?
Other designated entities on a national level (if applicable)
Total number
of PIEs
Total number of listed
companies
Austria No -
Belgium No - 900 -
Bulgaria Yes Pension funds; State owned companies; Other. 500 174
Croatia Yes Pension funds; UCITS1/Investment companies; Size criterion; State owned companies; Asset management
companies; Electronic money institutions.
350 104
Cyprus Yes Size criterion. 321 64
Czech Republic Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion. 900 200
Denmark Yes UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; State owned companies; Government. 900 -
Estonia Yes Size criterion; State owned companies; Government. 149 13
Finland Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies. 600 120
France Yes Other. 2,533 498
Germany No - 1,600 800
Greece No The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not currently used. 342 250
Hungary No - 102 55
Iceland Yes Pension funds. - -
Ireland No - 2,000 55
Italy Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; Asset management companies; Electronic
money institutions; Other.
1,430 260
Latvia Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Asset management companies. 75 33
Lithuania Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Other. 154 20
Luxembourg No The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not currently used. - 23
Malta No The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not currently used. 94 22
Netherlands No The option to expand the definition of a PIE to other designated entities is available but not currently used. 1,200 125
Norway No - 414 218
Poland Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Electronic money institutions; Other. 500 450
Portugal Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; State owned companies; Other. 1,300 77
Romania Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; State owned companies; Government; Electronic money
institutions; Other.
500 198
Slovakia Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; State owned companies; Asset management
companies; Other.
600 60
Slovenia No * At the time of the study no single definition had been put in place when implementing the 2006 Statutory
Audit Directive and the rules set for PIEs were applicable to listed entities only.
70 70
Spain Yes Pension funds; UCITS/Investment companies; Size criterion; Electronic money institutions; Other. 8,000 150
Sweden No * At the time of the study no single definition had been put in place when implementing the 2006 Statutory
Audit Directive and the rules set for PIEs were applicable to listed entities only.
450-500 450-500
UK No - 2,300 2,300
Source: The information in the table is taken from the FEE Survey on the Definition of Public Interest Entities (PIEs) in Europe (FEE, 2014). The FEE collected data from FEE Member Bodies from EU
Member States, Iceland and Norway. The number of PIEs and listed entities were originally provided to the FEE by Member Bodies and may therefore represent an approximate estimation.
1 Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS).
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Table 2. Classification of the major UK audit firms and key characteristics
Audit firms UK audit fee
income (£ millions)
Number of
UK offices
Number of
UK partners
Big Four
Deloitte 381.6 23 991
Ernst & Young 315.8 20 549
KPMG 414.3 22 602
PricewaterhouseCoopers 560.8 40 863
Mid Four a
Baker Tilly 55.7 28 107
BDO 86.4 13 196
Grant Thornton 93.4 25 203
PKF (UK) 52.7 23 70
Small-Tier b
Buzzacott 6.9 1 23
Chantrey Vellacott DFK 8.0 10 46
Crowe Clark Whitehill c 21.3 9 72
Haysmacintyre 7.9 1 23
HLB Vantis Plc d 5.5 19 143
HW Group 9.4 51 117
Kingston Smith 10.4 6 60
Littlejohn 6.4 1 31
Mazars 38.3 16 115
MHA Macintyre Hudson 10.1 10 42
Moore Stephens 12.6 34 156
RSM + Tenon Group e 30.1 42 244
Saffery Champness 6.0 10 59
Smith & Williamson 12.8 11 254
UHY Hacker Young 9.6 22 83
Source: The UK audit fee income is the average of the yearly fee income from audit for the period 2005 - 2012 according to figures
from the FRCs Key Facts and Trends in the Accountancy Profession. The number of UK offices and number of partners are correct
as at 2012.
a The cut-off point for leading mid-tier audit firms is subjective (Peel, 2013) so the definition of this group changes within the literature.
Over the sample period the four largest Mid-tier audit firms do not change and in descending order of size are: Grant Thornton, BDO,
PKF (UK) and Baker Tilly (correct at 2012, the final year of the panel). As well as being differentiated in terms of income, the Mid
Four and the Big Four are the only audit firms covered by the ICAEW Audit Firm Governance Code at the time of the study.
b Audit firms which have appeared in the top 20 of the FRCs list of the major auditing firms at any point throughout the sample
period. Also included in the group but not individually listed was RSM Robson Rhodes prior to its merger with Grant Thornton on
29th April 2007.
c Horwath Clark Whitehill prior to rebrand on 1 October 2010.
d HLB Vantis - number of UK offices and number of partners prior to entering administration on 29th June 2010.
e RSM + Tenon Group - resulting from a merger between RSM Bentley Jennison and Tenon Audit on 29th December 2010, therefore
the top 20 group also includes RSM Bentley Jennsion and Tenon Audit. On the 22 August 2013 the operating companies in the RSM
Tenon group were acquired by Baker Tilly; the number of UK offices and number of partners listed is for RSM Tenon 2012 (most
recent form of group).
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by year 2005-2012
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Panel A: Big Four clients
Obs. 444 471 496 494 570 629 690 655 556
Turnover (£'000) 47,900 53,200 64,400 81,300 75,200 80,100 86,800 94,600 75,000
Total Assets (£'000) 52,500 70,600 125,000 145,000 142,000 138,000 141,000 147,000 124,000
Employees 410 408 466 528 525 534 570 636 520
Audit Fees 30,491 35,923 44,184 53,008 51,113 54,023 59,215 60,889 49,992
Co.s reporting non-audit
fees
57.43% 56.48% 59.07% 63.77% 64.74% 65.66% 66.67% 68.85% 63.43%
Non-audit fees
proportion
88.61% 82.75% 88.02% 94.79% 99.39% 71.83% 73.34% 68.13% 81.93%
Switches 2.55% 2.82% 2.63% 3.51% 3.97% 4.64% 4.12% 3.21%
Panel B: Mid Four clients
Obs. 372 404 453 474 568 624 672 636 525
Turnover (£'000) 18,800 18,700 22,000 26,700 25,400 25,900 27,800 30,000 25,100
Total Assets (£'000) 16,200 16,800 21,900 23,000 22,200 22,600 23,100 26,700 22,100
Employees 199 198 222 246 224 218 221 233 222
Audit Fees 17,253 17,832 20,491 23,191 23,887 24,283 24,952 27,084 22,986
Co.s reporting non-audit
fees
41.40% 45.30% 50.33% 51.90% 54.05% 52.40% 55.36% 60.22% 52.34%
Non-audit fees
proportion
89.16% 72.35% 72.45% 65.44% 65.80% 59.71% 62.16% 64.59% 66.87%
Switches 3.47% 3.97% 4.64% 3.52% 2.56% 4.32% 5.35% 3.64%
Panel C: Small-Tier clients
Obs. 309 368 377 395 491 572 616 574 463
Turnover (£'000) 10,500 13,200 15,100 17,500 16,600 15,800 18,100 20,100 16,400
Total Assets (£'000) 9,207 10,700 12,900 14,900 16,800 16,100 17,600 19,500 15,400
Employees 152 154 159 164 142 127 145 155 148
Audit Fees 12,523 13,721 14,882 16,512 16,918 16,292 16,508 17,520 15,911
Co.s reporting non-audit
fees
26.21% 25.54% 31.83% 38.23% 39.92% 39.86% 40.10% 40.94% 36.52%
Non-audit fees
proportion
108.24% 102.81% 90.36% 100.09% 102.12% 90.86% 85.82% 88.80% 94.02%
Switches 6.25% 5.04% 4.30% 2.65% 4.02% 6.66% 5.05% 4.46%
Panel D: Non-major clients
Obs. 2,488 2,985 2,925 2,854 3,297 3,029 3,203 2,983 2,971
Turnover (£'000) 6,092 5,800 6,659 7,822 9,614 13,000 14,300 15,500 9,992
Total Assets (£'000) 5,050 5,294 6,100 7,080 7,816 10,100 10,800 11,500 8,058
Employees 111 120 118 129 118 119 122 129 122
Audit Fees 7,167 7,054 7,650 8,401 10,242 12,799 13,467 14,057 10,219
Co.s reporting non-audit
fees
12.66% 13.03% 14.26% 16.29% 21.60% 28.10% 31.38% 32.52% 21.56%
Non-audit fees
proportion
97.58% 100.01% 95.11% 104.97% 111.72% 106.59% 109.27% 105.90% 105.60%
Switches 3.35% 3.11% 3.08% 2.67% 3.07% 3.62% 4.96% 3.05%
Variable definitions: Obs., number of observations per year; Turnover, average turnover in thousands; Total assets, average total assets
in thousands; Employees, average number of employees; Audit fees, average total audit fees; Co.s reporting non-audit fees, the proportion
of companies reporting non-audit fees; Non-audit fees proportion, average of non-audit fees as a percentage of audit fees; Switches, the
proportion of companies switching into each audit firm group. The final column shows averages for the entire eight year panel.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by company size
Size Decile
Small Large
1
(n= 3,516)
2
(n= 3,588)
3
(n = 3,602)
4
(n = 3,560)
5
(n= 3,561)
6
(n = 3,657)
7
(n= 3,659)
8
(n = 3,656)
9
(n= 3,661)
10
(n= 3,658)
Panel A: Company size
Total Assets (£000) 313 1,092 1,763 2,502 3,432 4,804 6,822 10,700 20,200 196,000
Turnover (£000) 848 2,922 4,087 5,352 6,779 8,637 11,100 16,400 27,900 120,000
Employees 31 74 64 67 79 86 109 140 230 774
Panel B: Audit related variables
Audit Fees (£) 3,126 5,208 6,086 7,534 8,847 10,341 12,888 16,472 24,519 76,931
Fees-to-sales ratio 1.32% 0.70% 0.58% 0.43% 0.39% 0.32% 0.29% 0.25% 0.20% 0.17%
Co.s reporting non-audit fees 9.43% 13.93% 17.64% 21.71% 23.66% 28.51% 32.06% 41.22% 58.36% 71.90%
Non-audit fees proportion 118.02% 109.66% 108.87% 107.50% 92.75% 102.73% 84.57% 81.48% 78.53% 88.56%
Proportion of companies switching auditor 2.16% 2.77% 2.63% 3.07% 2.94% 3.54% 3.57% 4.18% 4.32% 3.63%
Variable definitions: for variable definitions see Table 3. In addition: Fees-to-sales ratio, average audit fees expressed as a proportion of sales as a percentage. Audit switches are identified by comparing current
and prior year auditors for each company in our sample, and classifying a change (no change) in audit firm, or both audit firms in the case of a joint audit, as 1 (0), but excluding changes resulting from audit
firm mergers. All averages are the aggregate means for each decile.
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Table 5. Auditor concentration in the UK private company market
Size decile
Small Large
Pooled 1
(n= 3,516)
2
(n= 3,588)
3
(n = 3,602)
4
(n = 3,560)
5
(n= 3,561)
6
(n = 3,657)
7
(n= 3,659)
8
(n = 3,656)
9
(n= 3,661)
10
(n= 3,658)(n=36,118)
Panel A: Market share based on number of audits
CR4 12.27 4.95 4.49 6.06 6.01 7.09 9.16 11.02 12.76 18.99 42.68
CR8 23.80 10.20 10.27 11.57 13.90 17.10 21.23 24.89 30.40 38.23 61.81
CR20 33.92 18.39 17.69 19.93 23.50 28.29 33.10 35.35 43.36 50.78 71.70
HHI 108 117 69 48 47 65 88 113 173 245 586
Gini 55.82 55.18 51.43 49.81 50.78 55.10 57.93 60.01 64.82 68.22 77.42
Panel B: Market share based on audit fees
CR4 35.58 8.93 7.34 6.66 7.27 8.61 10.30 13.14 15.01 24.37 62.46
CR8 51.10 18.61 18.98 15.78 18.87 22.30 25.22 30.07 33.70 44.61 77.33
CR20 60.63 31.01 29.58 26.18 29.32 34.40 38.35 41.50 48.10 55.91 83.71
HHI 418 103 82 63 76 99 122 162 215 316 1,095
Gini 83.63 64.79 66.29 62.76 64.22 66.79 67.71 70.60 72.80 75.06 89.10
Variable definitions: CR4, k-firm concentration ratio calculated for the Big Four audit firms; CR8, k-firm concentration ratio calculated for the Big Eight (Big Four and Mid Four) audit firms; CR20, k-firm
concentration ratio calculated for the top 20 audit firms (Big Eight and Small-Tier firms); HHI, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index; Gini, Gini-coefficient. All averages are the aggregate means for each decile.
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Table 6. Lobbying responses by organization type
N
Expand definition
(No)
Expand definition
(Yes)
No comment
made
Accountancy and audit firm (Big Four) 4 4 0 0
Accountancy and audit firm (Non-Big Four) 8 8 0 0
Accounting trade body 1 1 0 0
Asset manager or pension fund 5 3 0 2
Business representative/Non-accounting trade body 7 5 0 2
Governmental organisation 2 1 0 1
Individuals 1 0 0 1
Large company 2 1 0 1
Professional accountancy body 8 7 1 0
Total 38 30 1 7
Source: Data is collated from the responses to the Department for Business Innovation and Skills consultation on the European Union
audit reforms (Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation No 537/2014). The above data is collected from the publically available individual
responses from each organisation and the categorizations are the authors own. Specifically, the above data refers to consultation question
No. 5 Do you agree that the Government should not expand the definition of a PIE beyond the EU minimum requirement  that is
listed companies, banks, building societies and insurers? Please provide further information in support of your answer?
